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NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW

Notes
Evidence-Hearsay-Equivocal Replies to Accusations
When the Accused Is Under Arrest
Having been arrested under suspicion of robbery, the defendant
was confronted with a taxicab driver and an alleged accomplice who
each made statements implicating him with that robbery. When
asked what he had to say about those accusations, the defendant
replied, "I do not wish to make a statement until I see my lawyer,"
and, "Do you think I would tell you something that would put me
in jail?" Over the timely objections of the defendant, the trial court
permitted police officers to relate the accusations of the taxicab
driver and the accomplice on the theory that, when coupled with
the defendant's reaction to them, they constituted admissions which
were admissible despite the hearsay rule. On defendant's appeal
from his conviction, the Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Held, reversed.'
The court noted that "the general principle applicable to this
type of evidence is that an accusatory statement and the defendant's
failure to deny it are admissible only if the circumstances are such
'as would warrant the inference that he would naturally have contradicted it if he did not assent to its truth.' "2 The court also noted
that when an accused who is under arrest remains silent in the face
of an accusation the jurisdictions split as to whether the fact of
arrest alone is sufficient to prohibit the inference of admission, some
jurisdictions holding that an accusation made while an accused is
being held under arrest does not call for a reply and cannot be taken
as an admission 3 and others holding that the fact of arrest is only
one of the circumstances to be considered. 4 "But," said the court,5
Kelley v. United States, 236 F.2d 746 (D.C.Cir. 1956).
1d. at 749. The court quoted from Sparf v. United States, 156 U. S. 51,
52 (1895). To the same effect see: 4 Wigmore, Evidence § 1071 (3d ed.,
1940); McCormick, Evidence § 247 (1954); and cases cited therein. The
rationale is that prompt denial is the natural reaction to a false or unjust
accusation.
3
Rickman v. State, 230 Ind. 262, 103 N.E.2d 207 (1952); State v. Hester,
137 S.C. 145, 134 S.E. 885 (1926); State v. Redwine, 23 Wash.2d 467, 161
P.2d 205 (1945). This view is based upon the theory that the natural reaction
of one under arrest is to remain silent.
4 Scott v. State, 249 Ala. 304, 30 So.2d 689 (1947); Barber v. State, 191 Md.
1

2

555, 62 A.2d 616 (1948); People v. Bennett, 413 Ill. 601 110 N.E.2d 175 (1953).

Wigmore, op. cit. supra note 2, § 1072, describes this as the better view.

NOTES
"we need not select the rule we would apply had the accused simply
remained silent, for he spoke, and gave as his reason for'refusing to
make a statement his desire to first consult his lawyer .... [which
amounted to] ... an explicit rebuttal of any inference that the accused was admitting the truth of the accusations ... " Then the court
looked at the defendant's second statement ("Do you think I would
tell you something that would put me in jail?") and ruled that it did
not amount to an adoption of the alleged accomplice's accusation. 6
It is submitted that this rationale is misleading and that the
court should have been more detailed in regard to its interpretation
of the defendant's replies. First, it should be recognized that these
replies are equivocal, that either admission or denial can be inferred
from them.7 Second, note that silence in the face of an accusation
is also equivocal. Thus, it may be said that an equivocal reply is
tantamount to silence in this situation. So, if it is necessary to determine whether the fact of arrest should be controlling when interpreting an accused's silence, it also must be necessary to make that
determination when interpreting an accused's equivocal reply. Because it is not necessary that the fact of arrest be given the same
weight in both cases,8 this court correctly determined that it need
not rule in regard to silence. However, this court also failed to
directly determine whether the fact of arrest should be controlling
when interpreting equivocal replies; instead, it simply interpreted
the replies in light of all the circumstances and incidentally followed
the view that the fact of arrest is not controlling.
The question of whether the fact of arrest should or should not
be controlling aside, it seems unfortunate that the court would adopt
either view after it had ostensibly reserved the question. The confusion to which this can lead is illustrated by the Nebraska case of
O'Hearn v. State.0 This caseis often taken as leading authority for
the view that the fact of arrest is controlling, although the Nebraska
court expressly refused to adopt that rule and, instead, rested its

5 236 F.2d at 749.

6 Id.

at 750.

7In

fact, Judge Miller dissented on the ground that the replies were

enough to make the accusations admissible. Id. at 752.
8 For example, in Massachusetts the accusations will not be admissible if
the accused remains silent, but they will be admitted if the accused makes
an equivocal reply. Commonwealth v. Hebert, 264 Mass. 571, 163 N.E.
189,192 (1982). See also, State v. Thorne, 43 Wash.2d 47, 260 P.2d 331,338
(1953).

9 79 Neb. 513, 113 N.W. 130 (1907).
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decision on its interpretation of the equivocal replies' ° of the defendant." In so interpreting the defendant's replies, the court considered the fact of arrest, but it also considered other factors. Thus,
even though Nebraska is often counted among those jurisdictions
which hold that the2 fact of arrest is controlling, the rule here may
be to the contrary.'
It is suggested that an arrested accused's equivocal replies to
accusations against him should not be interpreted in the light of all
the circumstances until it has been determined that the circumstance
of arrest should not be controlling. This kind of approach would
meet the issue of arrest head-on and would probably lead to a clearer
statement of the law.
Howard E. Tracy, '57

10 "O'Hearn was asked by a police captain if he wanted to make any statement in regard to [the accusation]. He said he did not; he would make his
statement at the proper time, or that he would stand trial and tell his story
then, as the witnesses variously testify." Id. at 521, 113 N.W. at 133.
11 "... Under such circumstances, taking into consideration the fact that
the defendant was under arrest,

. .

. the fact that the defendant reserved

his statement until some future time is far from giving countenance to the
idea that he thereby assented to the statement which had been read in his
hearing. So far from giving color to the idea of assent, it rather conveys to
an unpredjudiced mind the idea of dissent and the intention to tell the true
facts himself." Id. at 522, 113 N.W. at 134.
12 In 1934 the Nebraska court said: "In the case of O'Hearn v. State,.
it was held that the test of admissibility of statements, made in the presence
of one accused of crime who remains silent, is whether the time, place, and
circumstances surrounding the transaction are such as to lead to the inference that the accused, by his silence, consented to the truth of the staterments." Vinciquerra v. State, 127 Neb. 541,542, 256 N.W. 78 (1934). The
other Nebraska cases which touch on this issue are: Musfelt v. State, 64 Neb.
445,448, 90 N.W. 237,238 (1902), where the court noted that the defendant
was ilot under restraint; and Stagemeyer v. State, 133 Neb. 9,25, 273 N.W.
824,832 (1937), in which the court merely noted that an accused's admissions
must be "accomplished in harmony with the principles laid down by this
court in O'Hearn v. State...."

